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ABSTRACT
In the Credit Lyonnais case, the CJEU concluded that the proportion
of input VAT deduction on mixed-use goods and services is to be
calculated by taking into account the output supplies carried out
by establishments located within the same territory only. This
interpretation of the VAT Directive leads to a different treatment
of domestic and foreign branches and is, hence, questionable in
the light of the freedom of establishment. This paper analyses the
impact of the fundamental freedoms on VAT law in general and
possible reasons behind the interpretation chosen by the Court in
the Credit Lyonnais case more specifically.
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1. About this paper
When enacting secondary law, the EU legislature is bound by EU primary law including,
amongst other provisions, the fundamental freedoms. The same holds true for the CJEU
when interpreting secondary law. Nevertheless, in the Credit Lyonnais case the CJEU
ruled, via an interpretation of Articles 173 et seq of the VAT Directive,1 that the pro-
portion of input VAT to be allowed as a deduction on mixed-use goods and services is
to be calculated on a territorial basis. This interpretation of the VAT Directive leads to
different treatment of domestic and foreign branches and is, hence, questionable in the
light of the freedom of establishment. As the Court accepts this discriminatory effect—
without discussing it in further detail—the Credit Lyonnais case reveals its somewhat
lenient attitude as regards the implications of the freedoms in the area of VAT. The
aim of this paper is to assess the potential conflict between the interpretation chosen in
the Credit Lyonnais case and the freedom of establishment and the legitimacy of this
interpretation in the light of the ‘rule of reason’ developed by the CJEU. As the CJEU jur-
isprudence on the compatibility of VAT law measures with the fundamental freedoms is
rather limited, a major part of the paper addresses whether and to what extent the exten-
sive jurisprudence on direct tax can be transposed to VAT law and to the specific case at
hand.
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any
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The paper will start with a summary of the judgment in the Credit Lyonnais case
including the background to the case and further implications arising from the judg-
ment (Section 2). Sections 3–4 will be dedicated to a thorough analysis of the funda-
mental freedoms aspect of the case. When analysing why the CJEU accepts the
potentially discriminatory treatment as being in line with the goals of the internal
market, several elements have to be considered: First and foremost, one might question
whether the different level of harmonisation in VAT law, as compared to direct tax law,
is of relevance when evaluating the effects of the fundamental freedoms (Section 3).
Second, one has to keep in mind that not every difference in treatment between a dom-
estic and a cross-border situation is prohibited by the fundamental freedoms. In this
respect, one might question: whether the territorial approach leads to a restriction on
the freedom of establishment at all (Section 4.2); whether domestic and foreign
branches are objectively comparable when it comes to input VAT deduction (Section
4.3); and whether there might be a justification for the different treatment which is
pursued and implemented by the VAT Directive in a proportional and coherent
manner (Section 4.4). In the last section, a conclusion on the main findings is presented
(Section 5).
2. The Credit Lyonnais case
2.1. Input VAT deduction
Deduction of input VAT is a core principle of the system of VAT in the European Union
which aims to ensure complete neutrality of taxation of all economic activities.2 Based on
the general rules of the EU VAT Directive, a taxable person is entitled to deduct input
VAT if the goods or services to which that input VAT relates are used for the purposes
of taxed transactions carried out either in the same Member State (Article 168) or in
another state. The latter scenario is subject to the additional requirement that the
output transactions would be eligible for deduction had they occurred in the territory
of the state where the input VAT is due (Article 169(a)). The calculation of the deductible
input VAT in the case of goods and services used for both taxed transactions and exempt
transactions (‘mixed-use’ goods or services) is regulated in Article 173 of the VAT Direc-
tive, according to which ‘only such proportion of the VAT as is attributable to the [taxed]
transactions shall be deductible’. This deductible proportion (often also referred to as the
‘recovery ratio’ or ‘pro rata deduction’) should be calculated ‘for all the transactions
carried out by the taxable person’. Article 174 of the VAT Directive clarifies the
method to be used for this pro rata calculation: the numerator is the ‘total amount… of
turnover per year attributable to transactions in respect of which VAT is deductible’.
The denominator consists of the ‘total amount … of turnover per year’ including trans-
actions eligible for deduction and those not eligible for deduction. Article 173(2) of the
VAT Directive grants the Member States the option to introduce a number of derogations
to the pro rata calculation; amongst others the Member States may ask for a separate
recovery ratio for different business sectors or they may disregard insignificant amounts
of input VAT. It should be noted that according to settled CJEU case law out-of-scope
2See, inter alia, Cases C-488/07, Royal Bank of Scotland, EU:C:2008:750, para 15; C-388/11, Crédit Lyonnais, EU:C:2013:541,
para 27.
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transactions (that is non-economic activities) are not to be included in the pro rata calcu-
lation based on Article 174.3 Hence, when using the term ‘pro rata calculation’ or ‘recovery
ratio’ in this paper, this refers to the apportionment of input VAT between taxed and
exempt transactions only.
The legal basis for input VAT deduction set out in Articles 167 et seq of the VAT Direc-
tive does not explicitly deal with whether the recovery ratio for mixed-use goods and ser-
vices is to be calculated on a world-wide or a territorial basis. Instead, the wording refers
generally to the ‘taxable person’, ‘all the transactions’ (Article 173) and to the ‘total
amount … of turnover’ (Article 174). The term ‘fixed establishment’ is not used. In
relation to output VAT, the Court ruled in the FCE Bank case, handed down in 2006,
that a fixed establishment is not a separate taxable person and there cannot therefore
be any taxable transactions between the head office and other establishments of the
same legal entity (single-entity approach), even in a cross-border situation.4 Against
this background, scholars have argued that a global recovery ratio is more appropriate.5
However, the practice of the Member States in this area has been diverse for many
years.6 In 2013, a French court asked the CJEU whether the output supplies of fixed estab-
lishments located in other Member States or in third countries have to be taken into
account when calculating the recovery ratio for the domestic head office according to
Articles 17 and 19 of the Sixth Directive (now Articles 173 and 174 of the VAT Directive).
This case is known as the Credit Lyonnais case and was decided by the Court on 12 Sep-
tember 2013.
2.2. CJEU: territorial approach
Advocate General Cruz Villalón considered that it should be up to the individual
Member States to decide whether or not to permit companies to include the output
supplies of foreign branches in the recovery ratio calculation of a head office.7 The
Court did not follow this proposal. It concluded that Member States are prohibited
from allowing companies to take into account the output supplies of foreign fixed estab-
lishments when calculating the recovery ratio of their domestic head office. The CJEU
based this result on three arguments: First and foremost, it pointed out that the system
for input VAT deduction falls within ‘the scope of the national VAT legislation to
which an activity or transaction must be linked for tax purposes.’8 This assumption
is supported by (i) the several options available for the Member States in Article 17
(5)(3) of the Sixth VAT Directive (now Article 173(2) of the VAT Directive), and
3Cases C-108/14 and C-109/14, Larentia + Minerva, EU:C:2015:496, paras 26–27 and the case law cited. The determination of
the methods for apportioning input VAT between economic and non-economic activities is at the discretion of the
Member States, however, when exercising that discretion they must have regard to the aims and logic of the Directive
(Cases C-437/06, Securenta, EU:C:2008:166, para 39; C-496/11, Portugal Telecom, EU:C:2012:557, para 42).
4Case C-210/04, FCE Bank, EU:C:2006:196.
5Cf Christian Amand, ‘VAT Grouping, FCE Bank and Force of Attraction—The Internal Market is Leaking’ (2007) International
VAT Monitor 242; Casper Bjerreegaard Eskildsen, ‘Pro Rata Deduction by Entities Established in Several VAT Jurisdictions’
(2012) International VAT Monitor 28; Thomas Ecker, ‘VAT Deductions’ in Michael Lang & et al. (eds) ECJ – Recent Devel-
opments in Value Added Tax (Linde, 2014) 354–356; Sebastian Pfeiffer, ‘VAT grouping from a European Perspective’
IBFD online, Reviewed 31 July 2015, Section 10.4.4.3.2.1.
6See in more detail Charlene Herbain, ‘The Journey of Branches into VAT Schizophrenia’ (2013) World Journal of VAT/GST
Law 207; see also the examples mentioned by Amand (n 5).
7Case C-388/11, Crédit Lyonnais, EU:C:2013:120, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón.
8Crédit Lyonnais (n 2) para 30.
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(ii) the system laid down in the Eighth Council Directive 79/1072/EEC and the Thir-
teenth Council Directive 86/560/EEC, both making the method of repayment of
VAT, by deduction or by refund, conditional upon the existence of a fixed establish-
ment.9 In the light of this systematic background, taking into account the turnover of
foreign branches would ‘seriously [jeopardise] the rational allocation of the spheres of
application of national legislation in VAT matters’.10 Second, including the output
supplies of a foreign branch would, according to the Court, not guarantee better obser-
vance of the principle of neutrality in all cases. Taking into account the turnover of
foreign branches could even serve to increase the recovery ratio, albeit some of the
acquisitions may not have any connection with the activities carried out by those estab-
lishments.11 Third, the Court argued that including the output supplies of foreign
branches would impair the effectiveness of the provisions of Articles 5(7)(a) and 6(3)
of the Sixth VAT Directive (now Articles 18(a) and 27 of the VAT Directive) as
those provisions grant the Member States ‘certain discretion’ with respect to their tax
policy choices.12 In order to avoid distortion of competition, these provisions give the
Member States the right to treat the in-house creation of goods and the in-house
supply of services as taxable transactions, if the taxable person does not have a full
right to input VAT deduction.13
Although the CJEU explicitly ruled on the recovery ratio calculation of a domestic head
office only, the same interpretation of Articles 173 et seq of the VAT Directive will con-
sequently also apply to fixed establishments.14 Based on the reasoning given by the Court,
any establishment (head office or fixed establishment) has to calculate its recovery ratio on
a territorial per-country basis excluding output supplies carried out by establishments in
other countries.
2.3. Arguments for a global approach
There are a number of reasons for questioning the interpretation chosen by the CJEU.
First, the wording suggests a different approach: the second sentence of Article 173(1)
of the VAT Directive stipulates that input VAT deduction shall be based on ‘all the trans-
actions carried out by the taxable person’. Moreover, in this regard Article 169(a) of the
VAT Directive, clarifies that, in principle, output supplies carried out in other Member
States also have to be considered.
In addition to the wording of the Directive, there are also systematic arguments sup-
porting a global recovery ratio approach. According to the FCE Bank case, the head
office and any fixed establishment(s) are regarded as one single taxable person.
Hence, a fixed establishment cannot carry out taxable supplies itself.15 As the
wording of the Directive does not include an express statement either for the output
side (Article 9) or for the input side (Articles 167 et seq), when it comes to the
status of a fixed establishment, one could argue that the inherent system of the VAT
9Ibid, para 33.
10Ibid, para 35.
11Ibid, paras 37–38.
12Ibid, para 39.
13See on these provisions in more detail Section 4.4.1.3.
14Herbain (n 6) 208; Ecker (n 5) 355.
15FCE Bank (n 4).
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Directive should provide a similar result for both areas.16 In this respect the Eighth
Council Directive 79/1072/EEC and the Thirteenth Council Directive 86/560/EEC
cannot convincingly support a different result for the input side. The CJEU itself has
established in the Daimler and Widex case that it is not the existence of a fixed estab-
lishment, but the provision of taxable supplies that determines the method of repayment
of VAT (by deduction or by refund).17
Furthermore, the solution adopted by the Court in Crédit Lyonnais suggests that the
system for input VAT deduction including the calculation of the recovery ratio is
always strictly limited to one country, but that is not true: under Article 169(a) of
the VAT Directive, supplies carried out abroad generate a right to input VAT deduc-
tion under certain conditions.18 Even more importantly, one has to keep in mind that
in a situation where a branch does not make any taxable supplies in the Member State
where it is located, the head office is nevertheless entitled to ask for a refund of input
VAT based on Directive 2008/9/EC (the former Eighth Council Directive 79/1072/
EEC) or the Thirteenth Council Directive 86/560/EEC.19 Hence, the EU VAT system
clearly also links input VAT with output supplies carried out in foreign territories.20
Moreover, the solution adopted by the Court may lead to non-deductible input VAT
even though the services or goods are used for an economic activity. This result is
questionable in the light of the neutrality principle and the aim of the input VAT
deduction rules.21
The most important reason (as regards this paper), however, is that interpreting the
VAT Directive such that Member States are prohibited from including output supplies
carried out by foreign establishments (head office or fixed establishment) when calculating
the recovery ratio of the resident establishment (head office or fixed establishment) may
also lead to an infringement of the freedom of establishment.
2.4. Territorial approach: an interpretation in conflict with the freedom of
establishment?
The potential infringement of the freedom of establishment as a consequence of
the interpretation chosen by the Court in the Credit Lyonnais case can be illustrated by
the following simplified example:
16See also the arguments by the taxpayer in Crédit Lyonnais (n 2), para 17; see in detail on this argument, Crédit Lyonnais,
Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (n 7), points 33–41.
17Cases C-318/11 and C-319/11, Daimler and Widex, EU:C:2012:666, paras 36–43.
18Explicitly confirmed by the CJEU in Case C-377/08, EGN BV, EU:C:2009:423. One might even argue that the interpretation
adopted by the Court is in conflict with the obligation set up by this provision. In the light of the interpretation of Art 174
VAT Directive followed by the Court, Art 169(a) VAT Directive may, however, only refer to those output supplies that are
taxable abroad but are attributable to a domestic establishment (head office or fixed establishment). Another interpret-
ation which could define the scope of application of Art 169(a) VAT Directive would be to focus on non-mixed-use assets,
thus Art 169(a) VAT Directive might cover those supplies carried out by a foreign fixed establishment which can be
directly linked to a specific input supply.
19Daimler and Widex (n 17), paras 31 et seq. According to Art 5(2) in conjunction with Art 6 of Directive 2008/9/EC the
recovery ratio for mixed-use assets in such a scenario is to be based on the output supplies conducted by the place
of business (‘Member State of establishment’), adjusted by reference to the transactions that would give rise to a
right to deduction if they were carried out in the Member State of refund (double limitation on the deductibility).
See for a similar case in relation to the former Directive 79/1072/EEC, the landmark case C-136/99, Société Monte Dei
Paschi Di Siena, EU:C:2000:408, paras 26 et seq.
20Also critical is Herbain (n 6) 209 et seq.
21Cf Herbain (n 6) 212; Ecker (n 5) 354.
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A company consists of a place of business and one fixed establishment. The place of
business carries out exempt supplies in the amount of 100 (e.g. letting of real estate for
residential purposes, Article 135(1)(l)). The fixed establishment conducts taxed supplies
in the amount of 100 (e.g. letting of real estate for touristic purposes, Article 135(2)(a)).
The place of business acquires a computer which is used for accounting purposes for
both activities in equal parts (mixed-use good).
If the fixed establishment and the place of business are located in the same Member
State, the result will be as follows: the recovery ratio based on Article 174 of the VAT
Directive is to be calculated by using the taxed supplies (100) in the numerator and the
total turnover (200) in the denominator. Hence, the taxable person will have a right of
deduction of 50% of the input VAT charged for the computer.
If one adds a border between the place of business and the fixed establishment the result
is different. According to the Credit Lyonnais case, the head office is not allowed to take
into account the taxed output supplies of the foreign fixed establishment when calculating
the recovery ratio. Moreover, according to the FCE Bank case, the recharging of costs
between the place of business and the fixed establishment is not a taxable transaction
and cannot therefore increase the numerator. Based on the interaction of the Credit Lyon-
nais and the FCE Bank cases, the result in the cross-border situation is as follows: since the
place of business carries out exempt supplies only, the numerator is zero. Hence, the
taxable person does not have any right to deduct the input VAT on the cost of the com-
puter, although it is—similarly to the purely domestic situation—partly (one half) used for
taxable output supplies. To sum up: if the output supplies of a foreign fixed establishment
are not tax exempt, excluding those output supplies leads to a lower recovery ratio for the
head office compared to conducting the same output supplies via a domestic fixed
establishment.22
22One has to keep in mind, though, that if the foreign branch makes exempt output supplies, the recovery ratio of the head
office might be higher based on the Credit Lyonnais case. The Credit Lyonnais case may, hence, work in in favour of the
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The two situations—carrying out supplies via a domestic and a foreign fixed establish-
ment—are treated differently purely due to the border. A lower recovery ratio leads to
higher VAT costs for the taxable person. These additional costs might deter a business
from setting up a branch in another Member State. Hence, the interpretation of the
VAT Directive chosen by the CJEU in the Credit Lyonnais case arguably leads to an infrin-
gement of the freedom of establishment.23 Note, that this argument is valid with respect to
entities operating frommultiple locations in the European Union and EEAMember States
only, since third-country establishments are not covered by the freedom of establishment.
Since, based on the hierarchy of norms, secondary lawmust be in line with primary law,
the Court has constantly emphasised that Directive provisions must be interpreted in the
light of the fundamental freedoms.24 More precisely, if the wording of an instrument of
secondary EU law is open to more than one interpretation, ‘preference should be given
to the interpretation which renders the provision consistent with the EC Treaty [now
TFEU] rather than to the interpretation which leads to its being incompatible with the
Treaty’.25 In the light of these obligations, the interpretation of the VAT Directive in
the Credit Lyonnais case may reveal some important aspects with respect to the effects
of the fundamental freedoms in the area of VAT. Although the parties to the proceedings
argued that the Directive had to be interpreted consistently with the treaty freedoms,26 the
CJEU did not explicitly deal with the different treatment of domestic and foreign branches
caused by its interpretation and the potential implications for the freedom of establish-
ment. With respect to whether a territorial or global recovery ratio is to be preferred,
the wording of the EU VAT Directive (Articles 173 et seq) is doubtlessly open to more
than one interpretation.27 Based on the wording of the Directive provisions and their sys-
tematic context, it would definitely have been possible for the Court to have argued for a
global recovery ratio, which would thereby have avoided any potential conflict with the
freedom of establishment. The Court did not choose that interpretation which suggests
that the CJEU is of the opinion that a different treatment of domestic and foreign branches
with respect to the input VAT recovery ratio is compatible with the freedom of
establishment.
When analysing why the Court went down this route, different arguments can be
advanced and these will be separately analysed in Sections 3 and 4. First, the different
level of harmonisation in VAT law, as compared to direct tax law, may have influenced
taxpayer and to the detriment of the taxpayer depending on the specific situation; see in more detail on this aspect Sec-
tions 4.2 and 4.4.1 and 4.4.2.
23Compare also the pleas by the company LCL as noted in the opinion of AG Cruz Villalón, Crédit Lyonnais, Opinion of AG
Cruz Villalón (n 7), point 70. In addition, one could argue that the Credit Lyonnais case also leads to a different treatment
of foreign branches and foreign subsidiaries (compare the pleas by the company LCL noted in the opinion of AG Cruz
Villalón, Crédit Lyonnais, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (n 7), point 70). Since the CJEU is, however, reluctant to apply
this kind of vertical comparison including the principle of neutrality of legal forms when analysing the freedom of estab-
lishment in particular in outbound scenarios (see Cases C-298/05, Columbus Container, EU:C:2007:754, paras 52–53; C-
337/08, X Holding, EU:C:2010:89, para 38), this paper will focus on the potential infringement caused by the different
treatment of domestic and foreign branches.
24See in the area of tax law, inter alia, Cases C-15/81, Schul, EU:C:1982:135, paras 41–44; C-168/01, Bosal Holding, EU:
C:2003:479, para 43.
25Cases C-218/82, Commission v Council, EU:C:1983:369, para 15; C-305/05, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germano-
phone, EU:C:2007:383, para 28; similar, also, Case C-402/07 and C-432/07, Sturgeon and others, EU:C:2009:716, para 47.
26Compare the pleas by the company LCL noted in the opinion by AG Cruz Villalón, Crédit Lyonnais, Opinion of AG Cruz
Villalón (n 7), point 70.
27This becomes obvious when looking at the diverging opinions in the literature, the AG’s opinion and the Court’s
judgment.
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the Court. In this respect, the CJEU case law to date on the compatibility of VAT law
measures with the fundamental freedoms will be scrutinised (Section 3). Second, one
has to keep in mind that not every difference in treatment between a domestic and a
cross-border situation is prohibited by the fundamental freedoms. Different treatment
might be permissible where it does not restrict a freedom (Section 4.2), if the domestic
and cross-border situation are not objectively comparable (Section 4.3) or if there is a legit-
imate and proportionate justification for the different treatment (Section 4.4).
3. Fundamental freedoms in VAT: general remarks
3.1. Secondary law and fundamental freedoms
Compared to the extensive and ever growing case law on the effects of the fundamental
freedoms in the area of direct tax law, the number of cases dealing with the effects of
the fundamental freedoms in the area of VAT is extremely low. As at the end of 2017,
about three cases had been brought to the CJEU dealing with the compatibility of the
VAT Directive with the fundamental freedoms,28 and about three cases dealing with
the compatibility of domestic VAT rules with the fundamental freedoms.29
The limited number of cases decided by the CJEU in this area can be explained by the
different levels of harmonisation. VAT—in contrast to direct taxes—has been harmonised
by the VAT Directive to a great extent. The VAT Directive removes many obstacles to the
free flow of goods and services in the internal market. Hence, there is less scope for tax-
payers and courts to identify potential infringements of the freedoms.
The different level of harmonisation is also of major importance when evaluating the
effects of the fundamental freedoms in VAT. Due to the exhaustive harmonisation it
will be the Directive and the EU legislature which is confronted with the violation of
the freedoms in the majority of cases, not the Member States’ domestic law and domestic
legislatures. This may include differences with respect to the standard of evaluation when
applying the rule of reason (‘judicial self-restraint’). In the Credit Lyonnais case, the Court
had to interpret the VAT Directive and thereby take into account primary law. In such a
scenario the case law on the compatibility of secondary law with the fundamental free-
doms seems of greater relevance.
According to prevailing opinion and settled case law, the EU legislature—although not
formally stated in the wording of the Treaties—is also bound by EU primary law,
especially the fundamental freedoms enshrined therein.30 The number of cases where
the Court has had to deal with the question of whether a Directive is invalid due to an
infringement of primary law, is, however, very limited compared to the overall amount
of its case law.31 However, the CJEU can not be held responsible for the limited
28Schul (n 24); Cases C-114/96, Kieffer and Thill, EU:C:1997:316; C-97/09, Schmelz, EU:C:2010:632.
29Cases C-390/96, Lease Plan, EU:C:1998:206; C-361/96, Société générale des grandes sources d’eaux minérales françaises, EU:
C:1998:282, paras 32 et seq; C-409/04, Teleos, EU:C:2007:548, paras 63 et seq.
30Landmark case: Case C-37/83, Rewe-Zentral, EU:C:1984:89, para 18; confirmed, inter alia, in Cases C-51/93, Meyhui, EU:
C:1994:312, para 11; C-210/03, Swedish Match, EU:C:2004:802, para 59; C-154/04 and C-155/04, Alliance for Natural
Health, EU:C:2005:449, para 47; Schmelz (n 28), para 50; compare Rita de la Feria in Dennis Weber (ed) Traditional and
Alternative Routes to European Tax Integration (IBFD, 2010) Section 12.3.3 with further references (IBFD online).
31See, inter alia, with respect to the compatibility of Regulations/Directives with the free movement of goods and/or Art
110 TFEU: Schul (n 24); Rewe-Zentral (n 30); Kieffer and Thill (n 28); Cases C-166/98, Socridis, EU:C:1999:316; Swedish Match
(n 30); Alliance for Natural Health (n 30); with respect to the freedom of establishment: Cases C-233/94, Germany vs
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number of cases, as the Court cannot initiate action of its own accord but is primarily
dependent on the initiative of national courts and the Commission. As a rule, the CJEU
presumes that EU legislation is lawful and will analyse its compatibility with primary
law only when specifically asked to do so.32 As the number of cases on the compatibility
of secondary law with primary law is limited, it is also no surprise that the number of cases
where the Court has found a provision of a directive to be incompatible with the funda-
mental freedoms is also very low.33
When looking at the few cases it has considered so far, the CJEU seems to apply a less
strict standard when analysing whether the EU legislature has infringed the fundamental
freedoms as compared to the standard it applies when domestic legislatures are alleged to
have infringed them.34 In the Rewe-Zentral case in 1984, the Court emphasised that the
‘Community institutions have a discretion in particular with regard to the possibility of
proceeding towards harmonization only in stages and of requiring only the gradual abol-
ition of unilateral measures adopted by the Member States.’35 This formula has been con-
firmed several times and is to be considered as settled case law.36 The Court has
emphasised this ‘harmonisation-in-stages’ argument in particular in the area of tax law:
the harmonisation of tax measures
is generally difficult … because they require the competent Community institutions to draw
up, on the basis of diverse and complex national provisions, common rules in harmony with
the aims laid down by the Treaty and … , as is the case in fiscal matters, the unanimous
agreement of the [Members of the Council].37
On some occasions the Court has also stressed that secondary law is issued in the Union’s
general interest and, hence, is intended to advance (and not to deter) the internal market
and the fundamental freedoms.38 Based on this reasoning—alone or together with other
reasons—the Court has refrained from declaring a provision of a directive to be invalid
in the vast majority of cases. To sum up in simple terms: if Member States harmonise
their domestic legal systems at the EU level, the review standard is less strict than that
applied in testing domestic non-harmonised law against the freedoms.39
It should be noted though, that this discussion on a ‘judicial self-restraint’ as regards
secondary law in the area of tax law has gained and will gain even more importance in
future years. Driven by the OECD BEPS project, since 2016 the European Union has
adopted a number of secondary law measures raising potential conflicts with EU
Parliament and Council, EU:C:1997:231; C-247/08, Gaz de France, EU:C:2009:600; with respect to the freedom to provide
services: Schmelz (n 28); with respect to the principle of equal treatment: Cases C-36/99, Idéal Tourisme, EU:C:2000:405; C-
460/07, Puffer, EU:C:2009:254; C-390/15, RPO, EU:C:2017:174.
32Case C-475/01, Commission vs. Greece (‘Ouzo’), EU:C:2004:585, para 18 and the case law cited therein.
33In four cases the CJEU invalidated a Directive provision of an optional nature (Cases 80/77 and 81/77, Ramel, EU:C:1978:87;
C-363/93 and C-407-411/93, Lancry, EU:C:1994:315; C-41/84, Pinna, EU:C:1986:1; C-20/85, Roviello, EU:C:1988:283); see on
these cases Rita Szudoczky, The Sources of EU Law and their Relationships: Lessons for the Field of Taxation (IBFD, 2014)
Section 7.5 (IBFD online).
34This also seems to be the prevailing opinion by scholars: see inter alia de la Feria (n 30) Section 12.3.3 with further refer-
ences; Eskildsen ‘VAT Grouping versus Freedom of Establishment’ (2011) EC Tax Review 115 et seq.
35Rewe-Zentral (n 30), para 20.
36See, inter alia, Meyhui (n 30), para 21; Germany vs Parliament and Council (n 30), para 43; Kieffer and Thill (n 28), para 37;
Socridis (n 31), para 26; Gaz de France (n 31), para 52.
37Socridis (n 31), para 26.
38See e.g. Case C-249/04, Allard, EU:C:2005:329, para 32.
39For a criticism of this approach Michael Lang, ‘ECJ case law on cross-border dividend taxation—recent developments’
(2008) EC Tax Review 73.
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primary law, primarily in the area of direct taxes.40 The most prominent example is the
Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) which includes six specific measures to fight
profit shifting and base erosion by multinationals.41 Many of these measures have been
criticised by scholars as being in conflict with the fundamental freedoms as interpreted
by the CJEU.42 Hence, the CJEU will most likely be given the possibility to develop
further and refine its approach. However, as the date by which the Member States must
implement the ATAD is the beginning of 2019 or for some measures even as late as
2022/2024, it will take some years until referrals from domestic courts on this subject
will reach the CJEU.
3.2. VAT directive and fundamental freedoms
Against this background, it is less of a surprise that, both in direct tax and in VAT law,
it has thus far never happened that the CJEU has invalidated a provision of secondary
law (in particular a directive) based on an infringement of the fundamental freedoms.43
In the event of potential conflict, the Court either tries to interpret secondary law in line
with the freedoms (or other primary law provisions)44 or emphasises the need to har-
monise in stages.45 As regards VAT, the potential invalidity of a directive provision due
to an infringement of the fundamental freedoms or closely linked primary law pro-
visions was discussed in three cases. In all three of these cases, the Court used different
methods to avoid declaring the provision in question invalid: in the Schul case, handed
down in 1982, the Court made use of extensive interpretation methods in order to avoid
a conflict between the Sixth VAT Directive and Article 110 of the TFEU (formerly
Article 95 EEC-Treaty).46 In the Kieffer and Thill case, handed down in 1997, the
Court found the obligation to report intra-EU supplies to be justified by the need to
promote the completion of the EU internal market and the need for statistical data.
Thereby, the Court also explicitly referred to the ‘harmonisation-in-stages’ argument.47
Finally, in the Schmelz case, handed down in 2010,48 the Court applied a less stringent
40See, inter alia, on the automatic exchange of information as stipulated in the Council Directive 2011/16/EU on adminis-
trative cooperation in the field of taxation, L 64/1 and data protection rights Viktoria Wöhrer, Data Protection and Tax-
payers’ Rights: Challenges Created by Automatic Exchange of Information (Amsterdam: IBFD, forthcoming).
41Council Directive 2016/1164 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the
internal market, L 193/1, amended by Council Directive 2017/952 amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid
mismatches with third countries, L 144/1 (ATAD 2).
42See, inter alia, on the interest limitation rule: Pieter Van Os, ‘Interest Limitation under the Adopted Anti-Tax Avoidance
Directive and Proportionality’ (2016) EC Tax Review 197; Sjoerd Douma, ‘EU Report: BEPS and European Union Law’ (2017)
IFA Cahiers 77; Ana Paula Dourado, ‘The Interest Limitation Rule in the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) and the Net
Taxation Principle’ (2017) EC Tax Review 112, 118 et seq; on the general anti-abuse rule: Luc de Broe/Dorien Beckers, ‘The
General Anti-Abuse Rule of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive: An Analysis Against the Wider Perspective of the European
Court of Justice’s Case Law on Abuse of EU Law’ (2017) EC Tax Review 143; Caroline Docclo, ‘The European Union’s Ambi-
tion to Harmonize Rules to Counter the Abuse of Member States’ Disparate Tax Legislations’ (2017) Bulletin for Inter-
national Taxation 378.
43See also Szudoczky (n 33) Section 8.3.1 (IBFD online).
44Schul (n 24); Case C-97/09, Schmelz, EU:C:2010:354, Opinion of AG Kokott, point 109.
45Gaz de France (n 31), para 52; with respect to the principle of equal treatment Idéal Tourisme (n 31), paras 37 et seq; for a
similar view on accepting distortional effects on competition caused by special derogations for specific Member States to
be in line with the VAT Directive: Case C-240/05, Eurodental, EU:C:2006:763, paras 48 et seq.
46Schul (n 24), para 43. The Court argued that the Member State of importation has to credit the VAT levied in the Member
State of exportation, although the wording of the Directive did not provide for such a credit mechanism. This approach is
evaluated as being contra legem (Szudoczky (n 33) Section 8.3.4.1 (IBFD online)).
47Kieffer and Thill (n 28), paras 29 et seq.
48Schmelz (n 28).
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proportionality test in favour of the EU legislature compared to its direct tax case law
approach without using the ‘harmonisation-in-stages’ reasoning explicitly (see in more
detail Section 4.4.3.3).
To sum up, the jurisprudence on the compatibility of VAT Directive provisions with
the fundamental freedoms is very limited and does not give much guidance. Nevertheless,
the case law indicates—in line with the case law on other secondary law—that the Court
applies a less stringent standard when evaluating whether secondary law is in line with
primary law compared to the standard it applies to evaluating the Member States’ dom-
estic law. The methodological approach used to achieve this result, however, differs
from case to case.
4. Applying the fundamental freedoms to the Credit Lyonnais case
4.1. The non-discrimination test
The fundamental freedoms preclude Member States from treating cross-border situations
less favourably than domestic situations, ‘unless such a difference in treatment concerns
situations which are not objectively comparable or is justified by overriding reasons in
the public interest’.49 When evaluating whether a discriminatory treatment is permissible,
the justification must also meet the proportionality principle, thus the domestic measure
‘must be appropriate to the objective pursued, and must not go beyond what is necessary
to attain that objective’.50 Based on this formula, there are three main possible arguments
for why the interpretation by the CJEU in the Credit Lyonnais case does not lead to an
infringement of the freedom of establishment: First, one could argue that there is no dis-
advantage and hence no discrimination is present; second, one might question and deny
the objective comparability of the situations; and third, one or more valid ground(s) of
justification could allow the discriminatory treatment to subsist.
4.2. No disadvantage?
In the scenario illustrated in Section 2.4, the calculation of input VAT based on a territorial
recovery ratio doubtlessly leads to a disadvantage in the cross-border situation compared
to the domestic situation. The business suffers higher non-deductible VAT costs caused by
the location of the fixed establishment abroad. However, excluding the output supplies of a
foreign fixed establishment does not necessarily result in a negative effect, but may work in
both ways: to the detriment and the benefit of the taxable person. A per-country recovery
ratio calculation leads to a disadvantage if the foreign establishment as a stand-alone has a
higher recovery ratio than the head office. By contrast, an advantage for the business
occurs if, on a stand-alone basis, the foreign establishment has a lower recovery ratio
than the head office. As it depends on the facts in each case, one could argue that an
interpretation of the Directive’s provisions in favour of a territorial recovery ratio is not
discriminatory as such.51
49See amongst others Cases C-446/04, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, EU:C:2006:774, para 46; C-47/12, Kronos, EU:
C:2014:2200, para 69.
50Cases C-451/05, ELISA, EU:C:2007:594, para 82; C-436/08 and C-437/08, Haribo, EU:C:2011:61, para 70.
51The AG also pointed out that the loss of the right to deduct input VAT when disregarding the output supplies of foreign
branches ‘is uncertain in nature, since … it depends on the volume of taxable transactions compared with the exempt
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However, this argument is not convincing if one looks at the direct tax jurisprudence.
According to settled case law on direct taxation, a disadvantage for one taxpayer cannot be
offset by advantages created by the same legislation for other taxpayers.52 For example, in
the Lakebrink case, the dispute concerned whether the exclusion of foreign negative
income when calculating the tax rate for resident persons was in line with the fundamental
freedoms. The Luxembourg Government argued that the disadvantage suffered by Mr and
Mrs Lakebrink was compensated for by the fact that, overall, the Luxembourg measure
was more favourable for non-residents as compared to residents because it took no
account of foreign income, whether negative or positive. The Court clearly rejected this
argument: the fact that a legislative measure places non-residents at a disadvantage
‘cannot be compensated for by the fact that in other situations that same legislation
does not discriminate between non-residents and residents’.53 Continuing along this
line of reasoning, the Court also acknowledged in the Lidl Belgium case that the lack of
a right to deduct the losses generated by a foreign permanent establishment, subject to
the exemption method in the applicable double tax treaty, as compared to domestic per-
manent establishments, amounted to a restriction on the freedom of establishment. The
fact that the disputed discriminatory effect only existed in loss and not profit situations,
did not prevent the CJEU from requiring justification for the different treatment.54 More-
over, the Court made clear in the Talotta case that, even if the domestic legislation is ben-
eficial in the vast majority of cases and only creates a hindrance to the fundamental
freedoms under very specific circumstances, this does not detract from the fact that the
individual case falls within the non-discrimination test.55 To sum up, the Court usually
focuses on the individual situation in isolation when analysing whether legislation estab-
lishes an obstacle to the internal market.56 Based on this settled case law, the fact that a
territorial recovery ratio may turn out to be more favourable to some businesses conduct-
ing cross-border activities should not rule out the obligation to carry out a justification and
proportionality analysis for those individual situations where the same legislation creates
obstacles to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms.57
It is worth noting though, that all the CJEU cases mentioned above dealt with Member
States’ domestic legislation, not harmonised Union measures. Hence, it can not be ruled
out that the CJEU might be willing to apply a more lenient approach as regards provisions
in the VAT Directive (see Section 3). The result in the Credit Lyonnais case might even
support such an assumption. Such a compensatory approach, however, should be rejected
for its generality, since it goes against the rationale of an internal market. Advantages for
some taxpayers can not take away a disadvantage for other taxpayers caused by the same
transactions carried out respectively by the company’s principal establishment and its branches and on the volume of the
common expenditure of the principal establishment for the benefit of its branches’ (Crédit Lyonnais, Opinion of AG Cruz
Villalón (n 7), point 69).
52See also Niels Bammens, The Principle of Non-Discrimination in International and European Tax Law, IBFD Doctoral Series
Vol 24, 2012, Section 15.3.6 and 15.3.7, IBFD online.
53Case C-182/06, Lakebrink, EU:C:2007:452, para 23.
54Case C-414/06, Lidl Belgium, EU:C:2008:278, paras 23 et seq. The Court followed the same approach in the Case C-322/11,
K, EU:C:2013:716, paras 24–28 in conjunction with para 64 and in the Case C-66/14, Finanzamt Linz, EU:C:2015:661 paras
27 et seq.
55Case C-383/05, Talotta, EU:C:2007:181, para 31; see also Case C-141/99, AMID, EU:C:2000:696, para 27.
56Cf Bammens (n 52) Section 15.3.6. However, an exception to this general rule might be identified in more recent juris-
prudence: Sopora (see Section 4.4.4.2) and Timac Agro (see Section 4.4.1.2).
57In a similar vein for VAT grouping Wolfram Reiß, ‘Begrenzung der Organschaftswirkung auf das Inland—Sekundärrecht
versus Primärrecht’ in Joachim Englisch/Hans Nieskens (eds.) Umsatzsteuer-Kongress-Bericht 2010 (De Gruyter, 2011) 229.
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legislation. Distortional effects on their decisions will still be in place. A tax measure
leading to discriminatory effects for some taxpayers can only be permissible if the discri-
minatory effect can be justified by a legitimate reason in the public interest.58
4.3. Lack of comparability?
4.3.1. Reasoning in Credit Lyonnais
Another argument to explain the result of the CJEU may rest with the lack of comparabil-
ity. It is settled case law that discrimination arises ‘through the application of different
rules to comparable situations’.59 Hence, if two situations are not ‘objectively comparable’,
the CJEU tends to stop its analysis and accepts a different treatment as being in line with
the fundamental freedoms.60 One could try to argue that the situations of a domestic and a
foreign fixed establishment are not objectively comparable when it comes to input VAT
deduction and, hence, they need not be treated equally. This seems to be the approach fol-
lowed by Advocate General Cruz Villalón who emphasised that ‘[a] company which has its
principal establishment and branches in a single Member State is not, with regard to the
objective system established by the Sixth Directive 77/388, in the same situation as a
company which has branches in other Member States’.61 Some statements by the Court
seem to build on the same reasoning.62
4.3.2. Direct tax jurisprudence
The comparability test has gained importance in direct tax jurisprudence since 2013.63
Nevertheless, scholars and Advocates General have rightly been critical of the fact that
the exact criteria for evaluating comparability are still blurred.64 According to ‘settled
case-law’65 the ‘aim’ of the disputed measure forms the basis for the comparability analy-
sis.66 In a growing number of cases—in particular in the practically important areas of
dividend taxation and loss utilisation—the CJEU also refers to the (non-)existence or
(non-)exercise of taxing jurisdiction in relation to a certain undertaking.67
58Inter alia, the need for administrative simplification (see in more detail Section 4.4.4).
59Case C-279/93, Schumacker, EU:C:1995:31, para 30.
60See, inter alia, Cases C-403/03, Schempp, EU:C:2005:446, paras 35 et seq; C-282/07, Truck Center, EU:C:2008:762, paras 36
et seq; Kronos (n 49), paras 81 et seq; C-388/14, Timac Agro, EU:C:2015:829, paras 65–66.
61Crédit Lyonnais, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (n 7), point 71. The AG continued: ‘Indeed, the former is in principle liable to
tax in a single Member State and therefore falls within the territorial scope of the VAT legislation of that Member State
alone, whereas the latter is liable to tax in the Member States and places in which it has a branch and therefore … falls
within the territorial scope of the VAT legislation of each of those Member States’.
62Crédit Lyonnais (n 2), para 45 (limited to branches in third countries): ‘That finding is not called into question by the argu-
ment that a company which has its principal establishment in a Member State and a branch in a third State must, for VAT
purposes, be taxed in the same way as a company, also established in a Member State, which provides the same services
without recourse to such a branch or which has, for that purpose, a subsidiary in that third State. Those different possi-
bilities reflect situations which are clearly different and cannot therefore be treated in the same way by the tax system.’
63See, inter alia, Kronos (n 49), paras 81 et seq; Cases C-133/13, Q, EU:C:2014:2460, para 27; C-87/13, X, EU:C:2014:2459,
paras 27 et seq; Timac Agro (n 60), paras 27 and 65.
64Case C-48/13, Nordea Bank, EU:C:2014:153, Opinion of AG Kokott, points 22 et seq; Joachim Englisch, ‘Nordea Bank—ein
weiterer Meilenstein der EuGH-Judikatur‘ (2014) Internationales Steuerrecht 561; Peter J. Wattel, ‘Non-Discrimination à la
Cour: The ECJ’s (Lack of) Comparability Analysis in Direct Tax Cases’ (2015) European Taxation 542 et seq.
65X Holding (n 23), para 22.
66See, inter alia, Cases C-231/05, Oy AA, EU:C:2007:439, para 38; X Holding (n 23), para 22; C-18/11, Philips Electronics, EU:
C:2012:532, para 17; C-123/11, A Oy, EU:C:2013:84, para 35.
67See, inter alia, for dividend taxation: Cases C-170/05, Denkavit Internationaal and Denkavit France, EU:C:2006:783, paras 34
and 35; C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14,Miljoen and others, EU:C:2015:608, para 67; for the area of loss utilisation: X Holding
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With respect to domestic and foreign permanent establishments, until 2008, the CJEU
had implicitly confirmed their comparability without giving a detailed reasoning.68 This
approach, however, seems to have been overruled by the Timac Agro case handed down
in 2015. In Timac Agro, the Court had to deal with the question whether losses generated
by foreign permanent establishments and domestic permanent establishments have to
enjoy the same tax treatment under German income tax law; in particular whether
Germany is obliged to take into account ‘final’ losses. The Court applied a restrictive
approach. To the surprise of academic commentators69 the reasoning was based on the
lack of comparability: the Court held that
in principle, permanent establishments situated in a Member State other than the Member
State concerned are not in a situation comparable to that of resident permanent establish-
ments in relation to measures laid down by that Member State in order to prevent or mitigate
the double taxation of a resident company’s profits.70
If the two states concerned have agreed on the exemption method for business proﬁts in
their double tax treaty, the residence state ‘does not exercise any tax powers over the
proﬁts’ of the foreign permanent establishment.71 This more recent case law reveals the
Court’s tendency to accept tax borders, territoriality and tax sovereignty.72 The implicit
denial of comparability of domestic and foreign establishments and the territorial limit-
ation of input VAT calculation as supported by the Court in Credit Lyonnais may ﬁt
with this new approach.
4.3.3. Relevance for VAT
As regards the aim of the provisions on input VAT deduction, it is rather difficult to infer
any relevant difference in the situations discussed in Credit Lyonnais. Articles 167 et seq of
the VAT Directive deal with one of the core principles of the EU VAT system: achieving
neutrality by avoiding VAT costs for businesses, insofar as the input costs are used for
taxed output supplies. This aim of achieving neutrality through input VAT deduction
applies equally to businesses with domestic branches and businesses with foreign
branches. In both scenarios, the taxable person may use the goods or services for taxed
output supplies and, hence, would like to benefit from input VAT deduction.73
However, a difference in the situations may be identified when focusing on the taxing
jurisdiction as the criterion for comparability. Onemay argue that in the cross-border scen-
ario the state where the input VAT is due has no right to tax the corresponding output
(n 23), para 38; C.-48/13, Nordea Bank, EU:C:2014:2087, para 24; Timac Agro (n 60), paras 27 and 65. Contradicting
however Case C-589/13, F.E. Familienprivatstiftung Eisenstadt, EU:C:2015:612, para 64.
68Lidl Belgium (n 54), paras 23–26; Case C-157/07, Krankenheim, EU:C:2008:588, paras 30–39.
69For a critical commentary, inter alia, Joachim Englisch in H. Schaumburg/Jochaim Englisch, Europäisches Steuerrecht
(Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2015) para 7.245.
70Timac Agro (n 60), paras 27 and 65.
71Timac Agro (n 60), para 65. The CJEU went on to state that comparability between foreign and domestic permanent estab-
lishments would exist in those cases where Germany allows the deduction of losses generated by the foreign permanent
establishments in the first place, although not obliged to do so by EU or DTC law (para 28). In the Nordea Bank case,
handed down a few months before Timac Agro, the Court had already paved the way for this ‘new’ approach (Nordea
Bank (n 67), para 24).
72Although the Court put great focus on the comparability test in the Timac Agro case, in other outbound cases involving
permanent establishments the Court has still confirmed comparability without providing detailed reasoning (e.g. Cases C-
591/13, Commission v Germany, EU:C:2015:230, para 60; C-350/11, Argenta Spaarbank, EU:C:2013:447, paras 22 et seq).
73See on the intention to use a benefit X Holding (n 23), paras 22–24.
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supplies for which the input costs are used. In other words: following this argument, input
VAT deduction would be possible only if the input VAT costs are used for taxed output
supplies in the same territory and, hence, generate VAT revenue for the respective
Member State. However, as the VAT Directive does not follow such a symmetric system
and does not link input VAT deduction and output supplies coherently to the territory of
the same Member State (see Section 2.3), this reasoning seems not to be very persuasive.
Also, from a methodological point of view, better arguments speak in favour of accept-
ing comparability. Relying on the lack of taxing jurisdiction at the comparability level of
the analysis leads to a major unsystematic overlap with the justification level.74 In contrast
to evaluating these arguments at the level of justification, using them to deny comparabil-
ity, however, implies a significant deficiency: the measure is not subject to the proportion-
ality test.75 The argument based on (non-)existing taxing jurisdiction should, hence, be
tested at the justification level only.
4.4. Justification
A third possible basis for arguing that a territorial recovery ratio does not infringe the
freedom of establishment could rest with the justification grounds. One could in particular
think of those justification grounds which have already been accepted in the direct tax jur-
isprudence: safeguarding the balanced allocation of taxing rights, safeguarding the coher-
ence of the tax system, safeguarding the effectiveness of fiscal supervision and combating
abuse. Moreover, one could also try to justify the different treatment for reasons of admin-
istrative practicability. This argument has not yet been very successful in direct tax law, but
could potentially have a broader scope in VAT.
4.4.1. Balanced allocation of taxing rights
4.4.1.1. Reasoning in Credit Lyonnais.One of the arguments used by the CJEU to support
its interpretation of Article 173 of the VAT Directive would suggest that the Court was
implicitly relying on a justification linked to the balanced allocation of taxing rights.
The Court highlighted:
Since the methods of calculation of the proportion constitute a fundamental element of the
deduction system, account cannot be taken, in calculating the proportion applicable to the
principal establishment of a taxpayer established in a Member State, of the turnover of all
of the taxable person’s fixed establishments in the other Member States, without seriously
jeopardising both the rational allocation of the spheres of application of national legislation
in VAT matters and the rationale of the aforesaid proportion.76
This wording shows some similarities to that used in the landmark direct tax caseMarks &
Spencer.77
74Cf Wattel (n 64) 544 et seq. For example, in Schempp and Kronos the Court could have relied upon the same arguments it
used for denying comparability by accepting the justification ground, safeguarding the cohesion of the tax system
(Schempp (n 60), para 35; Kronos (n 49), paras 81 et seq).
75Nordea Bank, Opinion of AG Kokott (n 64), point 27; Englisch (n 64) 561; arguing for a proportionality analysis within the
comparability test Wattel (n 64) 550 et seq.
76Crédit Lyonnais (n 2), para 35; see also Crédit Lyonnais, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (n 7), point 53.
77Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer, EU:C:2005:763, paras 45–46: ‘In effect, to give companies the option to have their losses
taken into account in the Member State in which they are established or in another Member State would significantly
jeopardise a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States’.
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4.4.1.2. Direct tax jurisprudence. The justification ground of safeguarding the balanced
allocation of taxing rights originally stems back to the landmark decision in Marks and
Spencer on cross-border loss utilisation handed down in 200578 and has been gaining
importance year on year since then. It has been accepted as valid justification in three
main scenarios:79 utilisation of foreign losses,80 exit tax measures,81 and anti-profit shift-
ing measures.82 In allowing this justification ground, the Court seems to accept that there
is an internationally accepted tax policy for direct tax law systems as well as for inter-
national tax agreements and that the Member States are permitted to rely on such
common principles when designing their tax systems and allocating taxing rights
between them.83 In particular, the Court acknowledges that Member States follow the ter-
ritoriality principle and that they may also take measures to defend taxation in line with
this principle.84 According to the Court, a balanced allocation of taxing powers ‘might
make it necessary to apply to the economic activities of companies established in one of
those States only the tax rules of that State in respect of both profits and losses’.85
Hence, Member States can take measures required for ‘safeguarding the symmetry
between the right to tax profits and the right to deduct losses’.86 Based on these arguments,
Member States are permitted to deny the offset of foreign losses if they cannot tax profits
from the same undertaking.87 As the Lidl Belgium and Timac Agro cases show, the Court
applies this line of reasoning particularly in relation to foreign permanent establishments
subject to the exemption method in a double tax treaty.88
4.4.1.3. Relevance for VAT. General Remarks: The justification based on the need to safe-
guard a balanced allocation of taxing rights between states has to be seen against the back-
ground that direct tax law is not exhaustively harmonised. In contrast to VAT, EU law
does not contain any binding rules on the allocation of taxing rights when it comes to
the taxation of income. Hence, the CJEU accepts that Member States make their own
tax policy decisions including the signing of tax treaties with other states and that they
may also take measures to defend taxation in line with these decisions. By contrast, in
the area of VAT the connecting factors for allocating taxing rights on one transaction
are harmonised by the VAT Directive (mainly by the place of supply rules). Member
States are, in general, not free in their tax policy decisions nor are they free to agree on
bi- or multilateral treaties amongst each other in this respect. Double taxation should
not occur. Hence, at first sight there is nothing that may be defended by the Member
78Marks & Spencer (n 77), paras 45–46.
79Compare in a similar vein Englisch (n 69) paras 7.226 et seq.
80Lidl Belgium (n 54); X Holding (n 23); A Oy (n 66); K (n 54); Case C-172/13, Commission v United Kingdom (‘Marks & Spencer
II’), EU:C:2015:50; Timac Agro (n 60).
81Cases C-470/04, N, EU:C:2006:525; C-371/10, National Grid Indus, EU:C:2011:785; C-164/12, DMC, EU:C:2014:20; C-657/13,
Verder LabTec, EU:C:2015:331.
82Case C-311/08, SGI, EU:C:2010:26.
83See N (n 81), para 45; moreover, inter alia, Marks & Spencer (n 77), para 39; National Grid Indus (n 81), paras 46–47. See on
this aspect also Nordea Bank, Opinion of AG Kokott (n 64), point 38; Englisch (n 69) paras 7.225, 7.227 and 7.246.
84Marks & Spencer (n 77), para 39; National Grid Indus (n 81), para 49; Verder LabTec (n 81), para 47.
85Marks & Spencer (n 77), para 45; K (n 54), para 50; Timac Agro (n 60), para 34.
86K (n 54), para 51; Nordea Bank (n 67), para 32; Timac Agro (n 60), para 35.
87It is irrelevant in this respect whether the lack of taxing jurisdiction stems from domestic law (Marks & Spencer (n 77), para
39) or is due to limitations set by a tax treaty (Timac Agro (n 60), para 58; Verder LabTec (n 81), paras 46–47 in conjunction
with para 4; for a contradictory judgment however: F.E. Familienprivatstiftung Eisenstadt (n 67), para 71).
88Lidl Belgium (n 54), para 33; Timac Agro (n 60), para 34.
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States in a similar manner to the direct tax area.89 Moreover, the reasoning on balanced
allocation of taxing rights in direct tax law is, ultimately, based on the territoriality prin-
ciple which is an internationally recognised principle in the area of direct tax law. As
regards VAT, the relevance of the territoriality principle is, however, more than question-
able. The allocation of taxing rights between states in the area of VAT, in particular in the
European Union, follows the destination and neutrality principles which do not seem to
have any similarities with the territoriality principle in direct tax law. The justification
based on safeguarding a balanced allocation of taxing rights between states is, hence, dif-
ficult to transpose to VAT.
However, although the VAT Directive establishes a very exhaustive harmonisation of
the law following the destination and neutrality principle, there are still areas where the
Member States enjoy a certain degree of discretion and where they can make their own
tax policy decisions.90 Discretionary power in particular exists where the VAT Directive
provides options for the Member States.91 In those areas there might be room for justifi-
cation on the basis of safeguarding the balanced allocation of taxing rights or on similar
grounds labelled with another terminology.
Options when designing input VAT deduction: When taking a closer look at the legal
basis in the VAT Directive, the system for input VAT deduction as stipulated in Articles
167 et seq of the VAT Directive leaves the Member States a margin of discretion by pro-
viding several options92 which was also pointed out by the Advocate General and the
Court in Credit Lyonnais.93 Moreover, the right to deduct input VAT is to a great
extent linked to exemptions, since input VAT deduction is possible only if the correspond-
ing output transactions are subject to tax. Member States enjoy rather large discretion
when implementing exemptions94 and the number and scope of exemptions varies
from Member State to Member State. This might also speak in favour of a territorial
approach when it comes to input VAT deduction.
However, neither of these aspects of tax sovereignty should be able to justify the exclu-
sion of output transactions carried out by a foreign establishment when calculating the
recovery ratio of a domestic establishment. It is true that the rules on input VAT deduction
grant a margin of discretion to the Member States. Nonetheless, it is unclear why this
should prevent them from calculating the recovery ratio in a non-discriminatory way.
The fact that Member States may choose to implement different options does not
prevent them from applying the same rules and limitations to businesses operating
purely domestically and to businesses operating across borders. In fact, in relation to
VAT, the Court itself constantly requires Member States to exercise any discretion
given by the secondary legislation in line with the principle of neutrality.95 None of the
options for input VAT deduction provided by the Directive seems to have any specific
89For a critical view with respect to the relevance of this justification ground in the area of VAT (although for other reasons)
see Reiß (n 57) 224–227; Tina Ehrke-Rabel, ‘VAT Grouping: the Relevance of the Territorial Restriction of Article 11 of the
Directive’ (2012) World Journal of VAT/GST Law 77.
90Cf Crédit Lyonnais, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (n 7), point 53.
91Important areas might be: Arts 11, 18, 27, 133, 137, 156–161 and 173–174 VAT Directive.
92See Arts 167a, 168a(2), 171a, 172(2), 173(2), 174(1) second sentence, 174(3), 175(2) second sentence VAT Directive.
93Crédit Lyonnais (n 2), paras 30–31; Crédit Lyonnais, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (n 7), point 53.
94See the options, inter alia, in Arts 133 and 137 VAT Directive and the special derogations for Member States in Arts 370 et
seq, VAT Directive.
95See, inter alia, Cases C-453/02 and C-462/02, Linneweber, EU:C:2005:92, paras 23–24; C-442/05, Zweckverband, EU:
C:2008:184, para 42; C-219/13, K Oy, EU:C:2014:2207, para 23.
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legal or practical restriction when implemented for businesses with multiple locations. For
example Article 173(2)(b) of the VAT Directive—an option which was highlighted by the
Court in Credit Lyonnais—grants the Member States the possibility of requiring the
taxable person to determine a separate pro rata deduction for each sector of his business
and to keep separate accounts for each sector. There is no reason why this requirement
cannot be implemented and applied to businesses with only one location and those
with multiple locations on an equal level.
Furthermore, tax sovereignty with respect to exemptions has already been addressed by
the EU legislature: According to Article 169(a) of the VAT Directive the Member State
where input VAT is due is required to grant an input VAT deduction only if the linked
output supplies taxable abroad would entitle the taxpayer to an input VAT deduction
under its domestic law as well.96 Hence, Member States’ sovereignty when designing
exemptions is upheld. A refusal to consider transactions carried out by foreign establish-
ments when calculating the recovery ratio for input VAT seems to go beyond what is
necessary to achieve this aim.
Options in Articles 18(a) and 27 of the VAT Directive: In Credit Lyonnais, the Court also
highlighted other provisions in the VAT Directive granting discretion to the Member
States. According to the Court, the obligation to take into account supplies carried out
via foreign establishments in the pro rata calculation ‘is liable to impair the effectiveness
of Articles 5(7)(a) and 6(3) of the Sixth Directive which grant Member States certain dis-
cretion while mitigating the effects of their choices in relation to taxation policy’.97 Both
provisions mentioned are nowadays to be found—without substantial amendment98—in
Articles 18(a) and 27 of the VAT Directive. These provisions grant the Member States the
right to tax in-house production of goods and services (‘insourcing’), if acquiring the same
supplies from third parties (‘outsourcing’) would lead to non-deductible input VAT. In
making this statement, the Court seems to be of the opinion that both optional pro-
visions—when exercised by a Member State—would lead to a separate-entity approach
in a cross-border situation and more precisely, grant Member States the right to tax
supplies carried out between different fixed establishments of the same taxable person
located in different states.99 If one follows this interpretation of Articles 18(a) and 27,
the refusal to allow a global pro rata calculation seems reasonable at first sight. Applying
a global pro rata calculation at the input level could indeed interfere with such a domestic
policy decision. The Member State would be forced to apply a single-entity approach on
the input side although it has exercised the option for a separate-entity approach in
Articles 18(a) and 27 for the output side. Since the EU legislature did not provide any
special rules for self-supplies based on Articles 18(a) and 27 within the pro rata calculation
in Article 173, applying these rules to scenarios where a Member State has availed itself of
96More specifically, the right to input VAT deduction is subject to a double limitation: that is, it has to be analysed whether
the output transactions entitle input VAT deduction both in the Member State where the supplies were made and in the
Member State where the input VAT is due (for resident businesses see Art 169(a) VAT Directive and Cases C-302/93,
Debouche, EU:C:1996:348, paras 14–16; Eurodental (n 45), paras 41–42; for the refund procedure see Arts 5 and 6 Directive
2008/9/EC; Société Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena (n 19), paras 26 et seq; in more detail Georg von Streit/Nico Duyfjes, ‘Die
Anwendung von Abzugsbeschränkungen im Vorsteuervergütungsverfahren’ (2009) Umsatz-Steuerberater 358 et seq;
Pfeiffer (n 5) Section 10.4.4.3.2.1).
97Crédit Lyonnais (n 2), para 39.
98See, inter alia, the statement by the Court: Art 5(7)(a) Sixth Directive ‘was reproduced in Article 18 of Directive 2006/112’
(Case C-299/11, Gemeente Vlaardingen, EU:C:2012:698, para 27).
99In a similar vein Case C-210/04, FCE Bank, EU:C:2005:582, Opinion of AG Leger, point 59; Ecker (n 5) 356.
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the option in Articles 18(a) and 27 leads to an unsystematic result:100 the business would
have to take into account the same added value twice in the numerator and/or
denominator.101
However, whether this systematic problem and lack of specific rules in the Directive
may justify the discriminatory treatment which arises from a strict territorial approach
when interpreting Article 173 of the VAT Directive is questionable. First, even by
denying a global pro rata deduction this systematic problem cannot be avoided. If a
Member State makes use of the option in Article 27, the mismatch between the input
and output side also occurs in purely domestic scenarios; this is the case if two establish-
ments of the same taxable person located in the same Member State exchange services or,
even more remarkably, if one establishment produces goods or services in-house for its
own use. It would only be possible to completely avoid this problem if the Court were
to require the Member States to implement a pro rata calculation per establishment or
per business unit (not per country). This is, however, not what the Court seems to
argue in Credit Lyonnais.
Second, it should be noted that Articles 18(a) and 27 of the VAT Directive do not refer
either to fixed establishments or to cross-border situations. Based on the historical
materials102 and also confirmation by the Court,103 the aim of Article 18(a) is to
prevent partly exempt businesses from gaining a competitive advantage via in-house con-
struction of goods. For businesses carrying out exempt output transactions, the self-pro-
duction of goods or the in-house supply of services, without recourse to third parties, is
more favourable as it avoids additional input VAT costs. Hence, businesses conducting
exempt activities which need to buy the same goods or services externally are at a disad-
vantage. In this respect Article 18(a) steps in: In order to achieve neutrality of the choice of
organisational structures (insourcing or outsourcing), Member States may treat the self-
production of goods as a supply of goods made for consideration within the meaning
of the Directive, thereby triggering input VAT costs for the in-house producing business
as well.104 Article 27 mirrors for services, the self-supply rule for goods. Although histori-
cal materials do not provide any explicit link between these two provisions, according to
prevailing opinion, which is backed up by the similarities in their wording, both provisions
serve the same aim.105 Moreover, in the Credit Lyonnais case the Court referred to both
provisions in one breath106 which proves their parallels. Seen from this teleological
100Cf the pleas by the Danish government reported in Case C-174/08, NCC Construction Danmark, EU:C:2009:383, Opinion of
AG Bot, point 83.
101This problem could be avoided only, if the recharged amount were to be excluded from the pro rata calculation (cf Ecker
(n 5) 356). Probably implicitly accepting this result to be in line with the Directive Case C-174/08, NCC Construction
Danmark, EU:C:2009:669, paras 36–47 (more explicitly Case C-174/08, NCC Construction Danmark, EU:C:2009:383,
Opinion of AG Bot, points 84–90).
102Annex A Point 7 Second Council Directive 67/228/EEC on the harmonisation of legislation of Member States concerning
turnover taxes, 1303/67.
103Gemeente Vlaardingen (n 98), paras 26–27; Case C-128/14, Het Oudeland Beheer BV, EU:C:2016:306, para 30.
104The taxable amount of the deemed supply needs to be defined by excluding those amounts for which no input VAT
deduction has effectively been made at a previous stage. As a result the effects of Art 18(a) VAT Directive are limited
to achieving an equal tax burden for in- and outsourcing businesses. They should not lead to a disadvantage for insour-
cing businesses (Gemeente Vlaardingen (n 98), paras 32 et seq; Het Oudeland Beheer BV (n 103), paras 41 et seq).
105Cf Joep Swinkels, ‘Fixed Establishments and VAT-Saving Schemes’ (2006) International VAT Monitor 420; Joep Swinkels,
‘Scope of the Self-Supply Rule under EU VAT’ (2008) International VAT Monitor 175; Cases C-299/11, Gemeente Vlaardin-
gen, EU:C:2012:561, Opinion of AG Mazak, point 45; C-92/13, Gemeente’s-Hertogenbosch, EU:C:2014:267, Opinion of AG
Sharpston, point 64.
106Crédit Lyonnais (n 2), para 39.
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background, neither of these provisions is aimed at establishing a separate-entity approach
for fixed establishments or at allocating taxing rights between states.107
The context of the VAT Directive even suggests that both provisions are primarily tar-
geted at purely domestic situations: first, since the cross-border transfer of goods is already
covered by Article 17, there is no need to apply Article 18(a) to cross-border scenarios.
Second, applying both provisions, in particular Article 27, to cross-border scenarios
raises problems of accumulation of VAT:108 since Article 27 is optional and the Court
grants discretionary power to Member States with respect to optional provisions,109
Member States may use the option in a different way or not at all. If one Member State
has exercised the option but the other Member State involved has not, this could lead
to a double burden of VAT or no taxation at all.110 If it is only the state of the fixed estab-
lishment using the in-house service that has exercised the option in Article 27, that state
will levy VAT on the self-supply, but the state where the fixed establishment rendering the
service is located may not allow systematic input VAT deduction for input costs necessary
to provide the in-house services.111 This ends up in a double burden of VAT which could
only be solved by extensive interpretation methods as applied in the Schul case.112 In the
inverse scenario, non-taxation is also difficult to tackle using the existing instruments.113
The lack of specific provisions in the VAT Directive for solving these neutrality problems
suggests that the EU legislature was not addressing cross-border situations when enacting
Articles 18(a) and 27. Against this background, the reference to Articles 18(a) and 27 of
the VAT Directive in the Credit Lyonnais case is confusing, as the Court seems to give
a different meaning to each of these provisions from that which their teleological, historic
and systematic background would suggest.
‘Symmetry’: Nevertheless, although the reference by the CJEU to the options stipulated
in Articles 167 et seq and Articles 18(a) and 27 of the VAT Directive is not convincing, in
the light of the more recent developments in the direct tax law jurisprudence it might still
be possible to justify the Court’s approach on the basis of safeguarding a balanced allo-
cation of taxing powers between states. In particular, one could try to transfer the increas-
ingly used set phrase on ‘symmetry’ by analogy to the Credit Lyonnais case. As already
mentioned in connection with the comparability level of the analysis (see Section 4.3),
unlike in a purely domestic situation, in the case of an entity with multiple locations,
the state where the input VAT is due might have no right to tax the corresponding
output supplies for which the input costs are used.114 This has echoes of
107Arts 18(a) and 27 VAT Directive undoubtedly also cover situations where a taxable person operates one place of business
only. There is also no requirement that the providing (or receiving) business unit fulfils the prerequisites of a fixed estab-
lishment in terms of permanence as well as human and technical resources or that the business units involved are located
in different states.
108Cf Amand (n 5) 247.
109See for example with respect to the option for VAT grouping in Art 11 VAT Directive: Larentia + Minerva (n 3), paras 39
and 41: ‘margin of discretion’.
110Cf with respect to the similar problem when applying cross-border VAT grouping Pfeiffer (n 5) Section 10.4.3.2; Reiß (n
57) 228.
111This will particularly be the case if the receiving fixed establishment supplies exempt services.
112Schul (n 24), para 43; Cf Amand (n 5) 247; critical of such methods is the more recent case Eurodental (n 45), paras 48 et
seq., where the Court accepts a similar double burden (due to special derogations in some Member States) to be in line
with the VAT Directive.
113Cf with respect to the similar problem when applying cross-border VAT grouping Reiß (n 57) 228 et seq.
114See for a similar view with respect to the Court’s reasoning Herbain (n 6) 208.
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the constellation discussed in the K and Timac Agro cases on loss utilisation, where the
Court accepted the non-deductibility of foreign losses as part of a ‘logical symmetry’.115
Still, there are good arguments against accepting the balanced allocation of taxing rights
between states as a valid justification ground for the different treatment of domestic and
foreign branches when calculating the recovery ratio for input VAT. The reasoning in the
loss utilisation cases in direct tax law is, ultimately, based on the territoriality principle.116
As already highlighted previously, the allocation of taxing rights between states in the area
of VAT, however, builds on other underlying principles, namely the destination and neu-
trality principles. Especially with respect to input VAT deduction, the VAT Directive does
clearly not follow a territorial approach. Based on the neutrality principle, the linking of
input VAT to output supplies taxable in another country is not detrimental to the right
to input VAT deduction as such (see Section 2.3). Hence, the context of the VAT Directive
significantly weakens this line of reasoning and should render the discriminatory measure
disproportionate.
4.4.2. Coherence of the tax system
4.4.2.1. Reasoning in Credit Lyonnais. Another possible justification which does not
appear in the reasoning of the judgment, but which is worth evaluating, is one based on
the coherence of the tax system. The argumentmight be as follows: as the territorial recovery
ratio works to the detriment and to the benefit of the taxable person, the business will not
only suffer a disadvantage, but benefit from an advantage in previous or subsequent years.
Hence, the territorial approach reflects a coherent system.However, in view of the direct tax
jurisprudence, whether this argument is persuasive is again rather questionable.
4.4.2.2. Direct tax jurisprudence. Nowadays, the coherence argument has two manifes-
tations in direct tax law: The original argument stemming from the Bachmann judg-
ment117 requires a ‘direct link’ between an advantage and a disadvantage in the hands
of the same taxpayer118 and with respect to the same tax.119 For example, in Bachmann
the Court accepted the non-deductibility of contributions to non-resident insurance com-
panies as being in line with the fundamental freedoms, since—in contrast to those made by
resident insurance companies—the subsequent payments by the non-resident insurance
companies to the same taxpayer could not be taxed.120 Under this approach, coherence
requires that the advantage is actually offset by a disadvantage in the hands of the same
taxpayer (factual direct link)121 and that the domestic provision itself ‘establishes a
relationship’ between both elements (legal direct link).122
115K (n 54), para 68; Timac Agro (n 60), paras 40 and 41. See also Krankenheim (n 68), para 42.
116See Section 4.4.1.2.
117Case C-204/90, Bachmann, EU:C:1992:35, paras 21 et seq. See also Case C-300/90, Commission v Belgium, EU:C:1992:37,
paras 14 et seq.
118See in particular Cases C-80/94, Wielockx, EU:C:1995:271, para 24; C-559/13, Grünewald, EU:C:2015:109, para 49; F.E.
Familienprivatstiftung Eisenstadt (n 67), para 83; however: contradicting Case C-35/11, FII GLO 2, EU:C:2012:707, para
59. See on exceptions to the ‘same taxpayer’-condition: Englisch (n 69) para 7.280.
119See, inter alia, Cases C-303/07, Aberdeen Property Fininvest Alpha, EU:C:2009:377, para 72; C-418/07, Papillon, EU:
C:2008:659, para 44; FII GLO 2 (n 118), para 58.
120Bachmann (n 117), paras 21 et seq.
121Cases C-293/06, Deutsche Shell, EU:C:2008:129, para 39; Finanzamt Linz (n 54), para 48.
122Cases C-471/04, Keller Holding, EU:C:2006:143, para 43; Argenta Spaarbank (n 72), paras 45–49; similar Grünewald (n 118),
para 51.
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The new manifestation of the justification ground of ‘coherence’—which has arisen
since the year 2010 mainly in the area of loss utilisation—requires the same advantageous
and disadvantageous element, but it is no longer seen as necessary that the disputed benefit
will indeed be neutralised (i.e. no factual direct link required). Rather, the Court seems to
regard it as sufficient if the law establishes a coherent link in theory, without analysing
whether the advantage will actually be offset by a corresponding disadvantage in an indi-
vidual case.123 In particular the K case on foreign loss utilisation follows this new line of
reasoning.124 However, in other judgments handed down after the K case, the Court is still
explicitly asking for a factual direct link.125 In all cases where the ‘new’ meaning of coher-
ence pops up, the Court has additionally referred to the argument on safeguarding the
balanced allocation of taxing rights between states.126 Hence, the most convincing way
to solve the conflict between the diverging lines of jurisprudence is to regard the reasoning
on safeguarding the balanced allocation of taxing rights between states as key in those
cases.127 In order to establish a systematic approach, references to ‘coherence’ in this
paper should be read as referring to the traditional meaning of the concept.128
4.4.2.3. Relevance for VAT. The coherence argument is not specifically linked to direct tax
law. Although the CJEU has never yet done so, there is room to apply this justification also
in relation to VAT. However, in the author’s opinion, the justification based on safeguard-
ing the coherence of the tax system cannot be relied on in the case at hand. The ‘coherence’
concept as it stemmed from the Bachmann case requires a strict correlation between an
advantage and a disadvantage with respect to the same taxpayer. This requirement is
not met here: The prohibition on including the supplies carried out by foreign establish-
ments when calculating the recovery ratio for input VAT may lead to an advantage or to a
disadvantage for the business in question depending on the specific situation in each sep-
arate tax period. It is not certain that the disadvantage (lower recovery ratio due to ignor-
ing the taxable supplies carried out by the foreign establishment) will be offset by an
advantage (higher recovery ratio due to ignoring the exempt supplies carried out by the
foreign establishment).129 What is more, Article 173 of the VAT Directive does not estab-
lish any link between these two situations. Hence, there is neither a legal nor a factual
direct link. The taxable person (e.g. Credit Lyonnais) may suffer a disadvantage only
and never benefit from an advantage, e.g. if the foreign establishment does not carry
out any exempt supplies at any time (or vice versa). Hence, the different treatment
123In favour of such an ‘new’ understanding of coherence: Nordea Bank, Opinion of AG Kokott (n 64), point 43.
124K (n 54), paras 67–70; possibly on the same lines Timac Agro (n 60), paras 39–41;National Grid Indus (n 81), paras 79 and 82.
125Finanzamt Linz (n 54), para 48: The Court held that if the corresponding disadvantage is ‘remote and uncertain’ and
depends on the facts of a given case, the Member State cannot rely on the coherence argument (very similar: Case
C-347/04, Rewe Zentralfinanz, EU:C:2007:194, para 67).
126Krankenheim (n 68), paras 41–44; National Grid Indus (n 81), paras 79 and 82; K (n 54), paras 67–70; Timac Agro (n 60),
paras 39–41.
127The Court itself has admitted in the cases following the ‘new’ approach—including the K case—that the coherence jus-
tification ‘coincides’ with the justification based on balanced allocation of taxing rights (National Grid Indus (n 81), para
80; K (n 54), paras 67 and 72; Timac Agro (n 60), para 47).
128For a contrary view see Nordea Bank, Opinion of AG Kokott (n 64), point 43.
129The AG also pointed out—although not referring to the freedom of establishment—that the loss of the right to deduct
VAT when disregarding the output supplies of foreign branches ‘is uncertain in nature, since… it depends on the volume
of taxable transactions compared with the exempt transactions carried out respectively by the company’s principal estab-
lishment and its branches and on the volume of the common expenditure of the principal establishment for the benefit of
its branches’ (Crédit Lyonnais, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (n 7), point 69).
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acceptable under the interpretation of the Court in the Credit Lyonnais case cannot be jus-
tified by the need to safeguard the coherence of the VAT system.130
4.4.3. Ensuring the effectiveness of fiscal supervision
4.4.3.1. Reasoning in Credit Lyonnais.Another justification which might play a role in the
given case and in VAT in general is the need to safeguard the effectiveness of fiscal super-
vision. If a taxable person conducts business in various different countries through fixed
establishments, a global recovery ratio would bring with it the need to include output
supplies made in a great number of states. All this data may not be easy to verify.
Hence, one might argue that a territorial recovery ratio is necessary to ensure effective
fiscal supervision.
4.4.3.2. Direct tax jurisprudence. In an internal EU direct tax context, the justification
based on ensuring effective fiscal supervision and the difficulties in verifying information
is in general not accepted by the Court.131 The CJEU has emphasised in settled case law
that EU taxpayers ‘should not be excluded a priori from providing relevant documentary
evidence’.132 Moreover, the Court has also pointed out that the Member States may make
use of the means provided by the Directive on Administrative Cooperation 2001/116/EU
(DAC) to ask for information and cooperation from the financial authorities of other
Member States to verify whether the data provided by the taxpayer is correct.133 In the
ELISA case the CJEU emphasised that even if it may be impossible to request cooperation
by foreign authorities (due to factual or legal limitations), this cannot justify a categorical
refusal to grant a tax benefit.134
4.4.3.3. Relevance for VAT. Based on the existing legal framework as regards the
cooperation between financial authorities for VAT purposes, the justification ground
that the different treatment is required to ensure the effectiveness of fiscal supervision
will—compared to the internal EU situation in direct taxes—play only a limited role in
the VAT area.135 Exchange of information and cooperation of Member States’ financial
authorities for VAT purposes is provided by Regulation No 904/2010/EU.136 Based on
this comparable legal framework, the jurisprudence on direct tax law can be transposed
to VAT: the Member States can either ask the taxpayer to provide all necessary
130The coherence justification could, however, also come into play if one focuses on the ‘new’ approach to coherence. This
concept, however, coincides with the justification of safeguarding the balanced allocation of taxing rights between states
and should, hence, be dealt with under that label (see Section 4.4.1).
131See, inter alia, Cases C-386/04, Stauffer, EU:C:2006:568 para 48; Papillon (n 119), para 54; C-233/09, Dijkman, EU:
C:2010:397, para 43.
132ELISA (n 50), paras 96; similar Cases C-254/97, Baxter, EU:C:1999:368, paras 19 and 20; C-39/04, Laboratoires Fournier, EU:
C:2005:161, para 25.
133Stauffer (n 131), para 50; Case C-318/07, Persche, EU:C:2009:33, para 61.
134ELISA (n 50), paras 94–100. Only with respect to third-country situations and third-country residents falling within the scope
of the freemovement of capital, is the Court willing to accept the argument of fiscal supervision as a valid justification. Also in
these situations a more burdensome treatment is, however, justified in a limited number of situations only, namely in relation
to those third countries to which the Member States have not agreed on a comparable legal framework to the DAC (Haribo
(n 50), paras 66 et seq). This case law is not relevant within the limited territorial scope of the freedom of establishment.
135See also Ad van Doesum/Herman van Kesteren/Gert-Jan van Norden, ‘The Internal Market and VAT: Intra-group Trans-
actions of Branches, Subsidiaries and VAT Groups’ (2007) EC Tax Review 38; apparently providing a different view Ehrke-
Rabel (n 89) 77–78.
136Council Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 on administrative cooperation and combating fraud in the field of value added tax,
OJ L 268, 12 October 2010, 1–18.
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information and/or make use of the mutual assistance procedures under the Regulation as
a less restrictive means of achieving the objective of fiscal supervision. In the Schul case,
the Court has already applied a similar line of reasoning to a VAT case.137 In the light
of the recent case WebMindLicences, it might be even harder for Member States to rely
on the justification of ensuring fiscal supervision in VAT law than it is in direct tax
law. Whereas the CJEU has held that the Member States are not obliged to make use of
the DAC in direct tax law in order to receive information from other Member States,138
the Court acknowledged in WebMindLicences that Regulation No 904/2010/EU sets up
an obligation for Member States to send requests for information to other Member
States under specific circumstances.139
Admittedly, the Schmelz case handed down in 2010 adds some confusion. In dispute in
Schmelz was whether the limitation of the exemption for small businesses in Article 287 of
the VAT Directive to resident persons was in line with the fundamental freedoms. The
Court acknowledged that it ‘is not at all easy’ for the host Member State to effectively
supervise the activities of non-resident businesses as all documents relating to their econ-
omic activity will be kept at the foreign place of establishment.140 Due to the lack of for-
mality obligations on small businesses (exemption from formalities based on Articles 213–
271), the Regulation is not of any help to the authorities since the home Member State will
not have any information available either. The host Member State can only get the necess-
ary information by subjecting the small business to information provision obligations
which would, however, be contrary to the aim of the exemption under dispute.141 This
outcome is surprising and also differs from the opinion provided in the case by Advocate
General Kokott.142 Less restrictive measures are available in order to attain the objectives
expressed out. Even though this would bring additional formalities for the taxable person,
it seems—in line with the Schul and ELISA jurisprudence—more convincing to allow the
taxable person to decide himself whether the benefits provided by the exemption offset the
costs caused by additional evidential burdens.143
Quite apart from these criticisms, the situation in the Schmelz case was a very special
one due to the specific aim of the provision under dispute. Hence, the Schmelz reasoning
should not be applied to the discriminatory issue at hand. With respect to businesses with
multiple locations within the European Union, the business can be required to provide all
necessary information for calculating the recovery ratio and this can also be verified by
relying on Regulation No 904/2010/EU. There is, as a rule, no legal or practical limitation
to the exchange of information. Based on the Schul case and the direct tax jurisprudence,
137Schul (n 24), paras 36–39; in a similar vein Société générale (n 29), paras 35 et seq.
138Haribo (n 50), para 100.
139Case C-419/14, WebMindLicenses, EU:C:2015:832, para 59 (contradicting this Case C-184/05, Twoh International, EU:
C:2007:550, para 31). See on this issue in more detail Karoline Spies, ‘Dispute Resolution under the EU VAT Directive:
Status Quo and Room for Improvement’, in Michael Lang & et al (eds.) CJEU—Recent Developments in Value Added
Tax 2016 (Linde, 2017) 98 et seq.
140Schmelz (n 28), paras 59–60.
141Schmelz (n 28), paras 66–69. In addition, the Court pointed out that granting the SME-exemption to non-resident tax-
payers may lead to risk of abuse: if businesses could apply for the SME-exemption in more than one Member State, they
might escape VAT although their overall turnover is not ‘small’ (Schmelz (n 28), para 70).
142Schmelz, Opinion of AG Kokott (n 44), points 107 et seq.
143The CJEU grants the taxpayer a similar option in its settled case law on exit taxes: option between the immediate
payment of the exit tax or a deferral combined with tracking obligations (see National Grid Indus (n 81), para 73).
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the categorical denial of the tax benefit in the cross-border situation should, hence, not be
considered to meet the proportionality test.
4.4.4. The need for administrative simplification
4.4.4.1. Reasoning in Credit Lyonnais. Another argument—which was not addressed by
the Court itself, but was mentioned in passing by the Advocate General144—to justify the
different treatment of domestic and foreign establishments might be the need for practic-
ability and simplification of the rules. A calculation of the recovery ratio for the purposes
of Article 173 of the VAT Directive on an EU-wide or global basis implies complexity and
administrative burdens both for the taxable person and the financial authorities.145 In the
case of an entity with fixed establishments in various Member States, output supplies
subject to different domestic VAT systems would have to be verified. Based on settled
CJEU case law, the right to input VAT deduction for cross-border operating businesses
is subject to a double limitation: meaning every output supply has to be analysed separ-
ately to see whether it entitles the taxpayer to an input VAT deduction both in the
Member State where the supplies are made and in the Member State where the input
VAT is due. Only if the output supplies qualify as taxable transactions in both states, is
input VAT deductible and the supplies can be included in the numerator of the pro
rata formula.146 Hence, the Member State of the establishment where the input VAT is
due would need to verify the character of every output supply and also would have to
learn about the tax treatment of those output supplies in the other Member States.
Since Member States enjoy a rather far reaching discretion when it comes to exemptions,
this double test would call—particularly in the case of multinational banks or insurance
companies—for a lot of resources in terms of people and time and would also be
subject to the risk of errors.147 Different languages and legal traditions as well as
changes to the domestic law are only a few obstacles to mention.148
4.4.4.2. Direct tax jurisprudence. Considerations of an administrative burden and practic-
ability nature have traditionally not been accepted by the Court as justification for a more
burdensome tax treatment of cross-border situations.149 For example, the Court has held
that higher social security contributions for workers who transfer their residency abroad
cannot be justified by reasons of simplification or difficulties of a technical nature.150 At
the same time, it should be noted that, outside the tax area, the Court has already accepted
in several cases that Member States are permitted to introduce ‘rules which are easily
managed and supervised’ when pursuing legitimate objectives (e.g. road safety,
144Crédit Lyonnais, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (n 7), point 63.
145See also von Streit/Duyfjes (n 96) 358 et seq; Ecker (n 5) 355.
146See Art 169(a) VAT Directive and Debouche (n 96), paras 14–16, Eurodental (n 45), paras 41–42; for the refund procedure
see Arts 5 and 6 Directive 2008/9/EC; Société Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena (n 19), paras 26 et seq; in more detail von Streit/
Duyfjes (n 96) 358 et seq; Pfeiffer (n 5) Section 10.4.4.3.2.1.
147With a number of examples von Streit/Duyfjes (n 96) 358 et seq.
148On the relevance of such obstacles when evaluating restrictions on the fundamental freedoms Case C-498/10, X, EU:
C:2012:635, para 50. Whether and how this double test is to be applied to situations involving third countries has not
yet been addressed by the CJEU. A global approach would bring a lot of complexity, since the VAT law of third countries
might follow totally contrasting principles (von Streit/Duyfjes (n 96) 363).
149Compare, inter alia, Cases C-29/82, Van Luipen, EU:C:1983:25, para 12; Case C-205/84, Commission v Germany, EU:
C:1986:463 para 54; C-18/95, Terhoeve, EU:C:1999:22, para 45; Papillon (n 119), para 54; C-326/12, van Caster, EU:
C:2014:2269, para 56.
150Terhoeve (n 149), paras 45–47.
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environmental protection).151 There is no objective reason why direct and indirect tax law
should make an exception to this principle. Hence, simplification measures which help the
tax authorities in managing the huge number of taxpayers and assessments they have to
deal with could be in line with the fundamental freedoms.
The most prominent examples in the direct tax area implicitly supporting this con-
clusion are the X and Sopora cases.152 In the X case, the dispute concerned whether the
collection means of withholding at source rather than an assessment procedure violated
the fundamental freedoms. Withholding at source allows for the efficient and swift collec-
tion of taxes for a large number of taxpayers having only a very limited connection to the
domestic territory. However, it also brings with it an administrative burden for a person
who is not the actual taxpayer (the recipient of the service). The Court found that collec-
tion by withholding was justified by the need to ensure the efficient collection of taxes and
did not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the aim.153 Amongst other arguments, the
Court highlighted that direct collection from the non-resident service provider ‘would give
rise to a significant administrative burden for the tax authorities responsible for the service
recipient in view of the large number of services provided on an ad hoc basis’.154 Hence,
the practicability of the tax collection mechanism was upheld by the Court, even though an
assessment might have been less onerous both for the person withholding the tax as well as
for the actual taxpayer and even though the Member States could have relied upon the Tax
Collection Directive155 to enforce taxes on non-resident taxpayers.156
In the Sopora case, the Court followed a comparably lenient approach in favour of sim-
plification. The Netherlands granted a 30% tax allowance to non-resident workers who
had their main residence more than 150 km away from the Dutch border. Non-residents
living closer to the Dutch border (in particular German and Belgian residents) were
excluded from this benefit, but had to supply evidence of any extraterritorial expense
incurred. The 30% tax allowance (reflecting compensation in respect of extraterritorial
expenses) and the 150 km limitation (reflecting those situations where daily commuting
is not feasible) were simplification measures designed to allow easy and efficient admin-
istration. By referring to its settled case law in the non-tax area157 the Court was reluctant
to find a violation of the fundamental freedoms: according to the Court these criteria set by
the Netherlands, even though ‘necessarily approximate in nature, cannot … [of them-
selves] amount to indirect discrimination or an impediment to the free movement of
workers’. The Court made one exception: discrimination could exist if the Dutch rules
‘were systematically to give rise to a net overcompensation in respect of the extraterritorial
expenses actually incurred’.158 Hence, as long as the criteria (in this case 30% and 150 km)
151See in particular Case C-110/05, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2009:66, para 67; moreover: Cases C-142/05, Mickelsson and
Roos, EU:C:2009:336, para 36; C-400/08, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2011:172, para 124; C-137/09, Josemans, EU:
C:2010:774, para 82.
152For more examples in CJEU case law see Karoline Spies, ‘Tax Deferrals and Fundamental Freedoms: Exit Tax, Final Losses
and Withholding Taxes’, in Werner Haslehner/Georg Kofler/Alexander Rust (eds.), Tax and Time (Kluwer, forthcoming).
153X (n 148), paras 39 et seq.
154Ibid, para 51.
155Council Directive 2010/24/EU concerning mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to taxes, duties and other
measures, L 84/1.
156On this aspect, X (n 148), para 47.
157Terhoeve (n 149), para 45; Commission v Italy (n 151), para 67; Josemans (n 151), para 82; Commission v Spain (n 151), para
124.
158Case C-512/13, Sopora, EU:C:2015:108, paras 34–35.
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reflected reality in most cases and were not arbitrarily chosen, the Member State was
allowed to apply them, even though a limited number of non-residents might suffer a dis-
advantage compared to non-residents of other Member States. This case law on direct
taxes confirms that the need for a practicable and efficient system with respect to the
huge number of taxpayers allows for measures of administrative simplification.159
4.4.4.3. Relevance for VAT. This jurisprudence may be of great relevance in the area of
VAT. In the field of VAT, tax administrations are also confronted with a huge number
of taxpayers and assessments. Hence, simplification measures are necessary to guarantee
practicability and efficiency of the tax system and tax collection. Since VAT is, in contrast
to direct taxes, also directly linked to the EU’s financial interests160—which has recently
been emphasised in a number of cases by the CJEU161—justification based on the need
for practicability and simplification in order to ensure efficient collection of taxes may
gain even more importance in VAT. The importance of efficient VAT collection is also
visible in the rather strict approach the Court applies when addressing cases of abuse
and evasion under the VAT Directive.162 In the words of the Court, a Member State is
‘under an obligation to take all legislative and administrative measures appropriate for
ensuring collection of all the VAT due on its territory and for preventing evasion’.163
Such efficient tax collection for VAT can be achieved only if measures for administrative
simplification are accepted—at least to some extent. If the Court imposes a duty on the
Member States to ensure VAT collection, it should also allow them to use practical and
feasible means to fulfil this duty.
If one applies this line of reasoning to the Credit Lyonnais case, there might be good
arguments to justify the exclusion of output supplies conducted by foreign establishments
when calculating the recovery ratio for input VAT deduction. A territorial recovery ratio is
definitely much easier to manage for businesses and the financial authorities. A global
recovery ratio would in many cases require complex evaluations and calculations to be
carried out by the businesses and the financial authorities. As the Court continues to
take into account the need for administrative simplification when evaluating the propor-
tionality of discriminatory measures in other fields of law, an extension of this jurispru-
dence to the area of tax law—particularly to VAT—would also be consequent.164
159This lenient approach at the proportionality level is also confirmed in the exit tax jurisprudence where the Court accepts
the obligation to pay the exit tax in five-year instalments as proportional, even though the taxpayer might not have the
cash available and even though the Member States may rely upon the Tax Collection Directive to enforce the exit tax (see
DMC (n 81), para 62).
160Based on Art 2(4) Decision 2014/335/EU and Art 2 Regulation 1553/89/EU the VAT-based resources are calculated by the
application of a uniform rate of 0.3% on the total VAT raised in a country in one year based on Art 2 VAT Directive. So if a
Member State suffers a loss in VAT revenue, this does not go at the expense of the domestic budget only, but similarly
also reduces the EU budget.
161Cases C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105, para 26; C-105/14, Taricco, EU:C:2015:555, paras 37 et seq; C-101/16,
SC Paper Consult SRL, EU:C:2017:775, para 47.
162See, in particular, Cases C-439/04 and C-440/04, Kittel and Recolta, EU:C:2006:446, paras 56 et seq; C-131/13, C-163/13
and C-164/13, Schönimport Italmoda and others, EU:C:2014:2455; C-251/16, Cussens, EU:C:2017:881, paras 31 et seq.
163Åkerberg Fransson (n 161), para 25; similar also Cases C-132/06, Commission v Italy, EU:C:2008:412, para 37; C-539/09,
Commission v Germany, EU:C:2011:733, para 74; Taricco (n 161), para 36; WebMindLicenses (n 139), para 41; SC Paper
Consult SRL (n 161), para 47.
164In the light of this justification ground one may question, though, whether the CJEU could have left the final decision on
whether a global pro rata calculation is practically feasible for each individual Member State. As the AG concluded in his
opinion, the Directive would have permitted such an interpretation (see Crédit Lyonnais, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón
(n 7)). Such an optional solution, though, would have led to great diversities between Member States’ domestic laws
and, hence, would have increased the complexity for businesses with multiple locations in the internal market as well.
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5. Conclusion
In the Credit Lyonnais case the CJEU decided that the recovery ratio for services and goods
used both for transactions for which input VAT deduction is allowed and for transactions
for which input VAT deduction is not allowed as stipulated in Article 173 of the VAT
Directive has to be calculated on a territorial basis. This interpretation leads to a different
treatment of domestic and foreign branches and is, hence, questionable in the light of the
freedom of establishment. Since the wording of Article 173 is doubtlessly open to more
than one interpretation, the Court needs to take into account primary law and in particu-
lar the freedom of establishment when interpreting this provision. Although the compat-
ibility with the freedoms was raised by the parties to the proceedings, the Court missed an
opportunity to address and clarify the effects of the fundamental freedoms in VAT law.
Since the Court nevertheless implicitly accepts the restriction on the freedom of estab-
lishment to be in line with EU primary law, the judgment confirms the tendency of the
Court to apply a more lenient standard when evaluating the effects of the fundamental
freedoms on EU secondary law in general and the VAT Directive specifically. The
Court did not disclose the arguments on which it relied when accepting the different
treatment of domestic and foreign establishments to be in line with the internal market.
The reasoning adopted by the CJEU in Credit Lyonnais, however, supports the view
that the Court was either of the opinion that domestic and foreign establishments are
not objectively comparable when it comes to input VAT deduction or that the different
treatment was justified in the case by the need to safeguard the balanced allocation of
taxing rights between Member States. Hence, the Credit Lyonnais case reveals that
when ruling field of VAT, the CJEU may be attempting to follow the trend towards
respecting tax borders, territoriality and tax sovereignty that it has developed in its
recent direct tax jurisprudence. However, in the light of the different context applying
in VAT, this reasoning is not coherent and, thus, not convincing. In contrast to direct
tax law, the allocation of taxing rights between states is harmonised in EU VAT. This har-
monised system based on the VAT Directive does not follow a territoriality principle and
does also not implement a territorial approach as regards input VAT deduction.
Although the arguments relied on by the Court are worthy of criticism, the result
achieved in the Credit Lyonnais case may still be reasonable. A global pro rata calculation
taking into account all establishments worldwide would involve a lot of complexity and be
administratively burdensome for businesses as well as tax authorities, which probably
would also offset any neutrality benefits connected to it. Hence, the need to ensure the
practicability and simplicity of the VAT system and tax collection might serve as a
valid justification ground for a discriminatory treatment. Since VAT is linked to the EU
budget and VAT collection has to cope with a huge number of taxpayers and assessments,
in the author’s opinion this ‘new’ justification ground will gain importance in the CJEU
case law in the area of VAT in future years, whether expressly or by implication.
The VAT Directive contains a vast number of provisions that establish a different—
more burdensome—treatment for cross-border situations as compared to domestic situ-
ations.165 In the light of the jurisprudence so far and as highlighted by the Credit Lyonnais
case, most of these provisions seem to be in line with the fundamental freedoms.
165E.g. reporting requirements, reverse charge, intra-community acquisitions.
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Nevertheless, it would be interesting to see more cases going to the CJEU on the compat-
ibility of secondary EU law with primary EU law. In the light of the BEPS project and the
drive for harmonisation that it has prompted, the limits set by primary EU law on the EU
legislature when enacting secondary law will be of increasing relevance in the coming
years.
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